






















The present paper addresses a very unpopular approach to statistical mechanics, namely, the open systems approach, or interventionism. Actually, calling it "unpopular" may not reflect the subtleties of the way people normally treat it. On the one hand, interventionism is mentioned as a possible framework for understanding statistical mechanics, in almost every text examining the theory's foundations. On the other hand, with few exceptions, interventionism is discussed briefly and then quickly dismissed. Bricmont (1997, p. 147) expresses a prevalent attitude when he writes: "I cannot with a straight face tell a student that (part of) our explanation for irreversible phenomena on earth depends on the existence of Sirius". This dual attitude is intriguing. What is it in interventionism that makes it so appealing, that forces people to return to it time and again, and yet makes it so objectionable as to make those same writers dismiss it so quickly and decidedly? The present paper tries to detect the origins of this attraction-repulsion story in some possible philosophical presuppositions of interventionism. It is not aimed at supporting or recommending interventionism, but only understanding it. Not everybody understands interventionism in the same way. What this paper describes is an attempt to distil, from various discussions, some general ideas that together form a defensible approach. These are supplemented by a philosophical background that makes interventionism look better and the objections to it less fatal. This paper's claim is that interventionism may be a problematic approach, but it deserves our serious attention, from both a physical and a philosophical perspective. 




Broadly speaking, interventionism is the idea that the way some of the thermodynamic properties of a system appear to us is determined by the system’s internal dynamics as well as its interaction with the environment. This idea is almost trivial: Who has ever denied that the environment affects systems with which it interacts? And who has ever denied that this interaction is practically unavoidable? What interventionism claims, however, is that the environmental interactions play a significant role in accounting for some aspects of thermodynamic phenomena, such as irreversibility. These aspects, it claims, would look very different in perfectly isolated systems. Interventionism does not claim that the environment accounts for everything. It does not deny the role of internal dynamics. What it claims is that the opposite does not hold either, that is, that the internal dynamics alone cannot account for everything. To account for some aspects of the thermodynamic phenomena the internal dynamics must be supplemented by the influence of the environment. Let me add some details to this general description.




With respect to induced processes, we are naturally interested in the limitations on our ability to manipulate systems. In the present context we are not interested in technological difficulties but in theoretical principles. Let me start by repeating some well-known ideas. Microscopic processes, governed by classical dynamics, are reversible: if all velocities are reversed at some point of time (a Loschmidt reversal), past positions and reversed past velocities are retraced. If, however, the system is perturbed, exact retracing is no longer possible, unless the perturbation is reversed as well. This requires control over the interacting environment, which is normally not available to the experimenter. Since the required control is unavailable, micro-reversals are normally not feasible. Exceptions are the cases where effective isolation can be maintained for a sufficiently long time, such as the spin echo experiments, discussed in section 4.1 below. Reversal is a particularly interesting example of control over the system's micro-evolution, but the same considerations hold when we want to bring the system to any specific microstate, in particular to one corresponding to a non-equilibrium macrostate. 
To induce macroscopic evolutions we also need to control the system's microstate, but to a lesser degree of precision: we only need to force the system to follow one of a set of microscopic evolutions. The need to control the environment in order to bring about a desired macroevolution of the system is well known in thermodynamics: thermodynamic parameters like pressure and temperature are determined through control of the environment. The environment normally diverts the system from its intended micro-trajectory, but whether or not this affects its macro-evolution depends on the relations between the micro and macro levels in that case and the sensitivity of the system's dynamics to perturbations. In some cases slight perturbations have a significant effect on the macroscopic properties, while in other cases the external perturbations are not felt at the macro level, despite the change they bring about at the micro level.




With respect to spontaneous evolutions, interventionism agrees with the following words of Sklar (1973, p. 210):
How a gas behaves over time depends upon (1) its microscopic constitution; (2) the laws governing the interaction of its micro-constituents; (3) the constraints placed upon it; and (4) the initial conditions characterising the microstate of the gas at a given time. Clause (4) is crucial. It is the matter of fact distribution of such initial conditions among samples of gas in the world which is responsible for many of the most important macroscopic features of gases; the existence of equilibrium states, the "inevitable" approach to equilibrium of gases initially not in equilibrium, the functional interdependence of macroscopic parameters summarised in the ideal gas laws, etc. The actual distribution of initial states is such that calculations done by the Gibbs method, with the natural probability distribution over the ensemble and the natural reduction to phase-averages, "works". This is a matter of fact, not of law. These "facts" explain the success of the Gibbs method. In a clear sense they are the only legitimate explanation of its success.
 
(The same idea, mutatis mutandis, holds for a Boltzmannian approach to statistical mechanics.) This, as Sklar adds, is the simple, correct, and full answer to the question of why the recipes of statistical mechanics work. And it never mentions an environment.
So where does the environment come in? The environment enters the picture when we want to use this explanation to provide predictions.​[2]​ It appears when we want to move on from the question "How does the system approach equilibrium?" (answered as Sklar does above) to the question "When can fluctuations away from equilibrium be expected to occur?" (Earman 1974, p. 39). To proceed from the first question to the second, we need to know what the initial microscopic state of the universe actually was, and this datum is unavailable to us.​[3]​ All we have is a little bit of data concerning macroscopic properties of the system of interest, and the information that this system has an environment. This is certainly not enough to deduce the future evolution of a system with certainty, but we may try to offer some guesses. Which of the available data is relevant for making the best guesses? This is an open question. In particular, it is an open question whether or not taking into account the fact that the system has an environment improves the guesses. Interventionism claims that it does. But how?
The basic idea is this. According to the explanation á la Sklar (in the above quotation), the future microstates of the system of interest are determined by its own initial state as well as the initial state of the environment with which it is about to interact, and therefore both are needed for prediction.​[4]​ Our data concerning the system consist of some macroscopic parameters, which allow us to form a guess regarding its microstate. Our data regarding the environment are even less complete, for the environment - being a residuary notion (see section 5) - cannot normally be measured even macroscopically. And so, whereas we can form some guess of the system's microstate using its macrocsopic parameters, we are unable to do this with respect to the environment. The result is that we cannot know anything about the environment in a direct way. What we can know about the environment is indirect, by way of its effect on the system. Comparing our best current theories regarding the system's dynamics with its actual evolution, we discover a gap: our theories do not predict the actual evolution. (This is the actual state of art; see Sklar 1993.) By way of elimination we conjecture that this gap is closed by the environmental interactions (see section 5.1). This elimination is our clue to how the environment affects the system. This information is then generalised: we conjecture that the future effect of the environment will be similar to its past effect, and we use this conjecture to predict the system's future evolution. 
Collecting the information about the effects of environments on systems in the past, it turns out that these effects agree with a range of possible environmental constitutions and states. And so, wanting to offer predictions, we are pushed to use probability considerations. These considerations appear when we try to make predictions on the basis of too little data. We are aware of this role and status of the probability considerations, and do not take them to be part of the explanation of the actual evolution. The explanation is given in terms of initial conditions, as in the above quotation. 
Bergmann and Lebowitz (1955, p. 579) note that, when applying probabilistic considerations to the states of the environment, we ought to avoid taking averages, since averaging emphasises the little that we know about the environment. Instead, we ought to emphasise what we don't know about the environment, by insisting on an effectively stochastic nature of the system-environment interaction. The interaction is never claimed to be really stochastic, of course; this interaction is subject to the same laws of physics that govern the internal dynamics of the system. The environmental effects only appear to be like that, to the ignorant observer who nevertheless wants to make predictions. However, predictions ought to refer to what we actually see. Our ignorant observer tries, then, to form equations of motion that will reproduce an apparently stochastic evolution, and to reproduce this appearance the observer needs to use non-Hamiltonian equations of motion, as done by Bergmann and Lebowitz (1955). We may conclude that these non-Hamiltonian equations of motion are part of our predictions, not part of our explanations.
	The empirical conjecture regarding the effective stochasticity of environmental interactions is brought, in interventionism, to replace ergodicity. The ergodic project has apparently failed: ergodicity is neither necessary nor sufficient to account for the thermodynamic phenomena (see Sklar 1973, Earman and Redei 1996, Guttmann 1999). Still, one basic intuition behind the ergodic approach seems to underlie every attempt to justify the use of probability distributions to predict the behaviour of individual systems. This intuition, which appears to be indispensable, is the following. Consider some phase function f that corresponds to the thermodynamic magnitude F of system S. And consider a region R in the phase space of S, which has a non-zero weight in calculating f. By assigning R a non-zero weight we seem to be claiming that the states in R are not altogether irrelevant for the dynamics of S. In other words, we seem to claim that it is not completely out of the question that S will, at some point of time, assume a state belonging to that region.​[5]​ How does one justify these claims without using ergodicity? Interventionism proposes that "because of the extreme complexity of the external interactions, during a sufficiently long time the subsystem will be many times in every possible state” (Landau and Lifshitz, 1980, p. 3). 

 In other words, the external interactions bring about the said effect of "not completely out of the question", which ergodicity was supposed to provide but didn't. In this sense, the environmental interventions bring about a (more or less) effectively ergodic behaviour, without the system having to have an ergodic dynamics. Some of the apparently insurmountable difficulties of the ergodic approach to the foundations of statistical mechanics are thus overcome.
	These are some of the ways in which interventionism accounts for the phenomena of thermodynamics and their connection with statistical mechanics. Apart from these general arguments, highly idealised models of the environment have been constructed to show that environmental perturbations can account for some central predictions of statistical mechanics (Blatt 1959, Bergmann and Lebowitz 1955). In addition, it is easy to make small, plausibly realistic calculations to show that minute perturbations can have dramatic effects on the evolution of thermodynamic systems, due to their typical dynamical instability. We do not need stories about the effect of faraway stars: the reader can easily make a quick calculation showing that an (ideally pointlike) experimenter weighing 100 kg and standing still 1 meter away from a nitrogen molecule will make that molecule move a distance equal to its diameter in 1.7 seconds, according to the Newtonian gravitational laws. The implications for a complex and dynamically unstable system of nitrogen gas are clear. 

2.3.	The dispute over interventionism

Despite these arguments, calculations and models, the relevance of environmental interactions for thermodynamic phenomena is commonly denied. Lack of isolation is not denied, but is considered irrelevant for these phenomena. For example, Bricmont (1997, p. 147) writes, “To see that lack of isolation is true but irrelevant, imagine a system being more and more isolated. Is irreversibility going to disappear at some point? I cannot think of any example where this could be argued.” (See also Davis 1974, pp. 74-78; Albert 1994, p. 672; Callender 1999, p. …; Sklar 1993, pp. 250-254.) The anti-interventionist approach focuses on ideally or effectively isolated systems, and aims at establishing the claims and predictions of statistical mechanics for such systems. 
	Which is right? This paper does not propose a definitive answer to this question. What it does is clarify some aspects of the dispute. But first let me try to convince the reader that the problem is worth pursuing. To this end I shall examine objections to interventionism, and show that they are not as strong as they seem at first sight. The conclusion from this survey will be that interventionism ought not to be dismissed as lightly as it often is. Following that conclusion I shall proceed to examine some philosophical foundations of this approach.





The first objection to interventionism concerns the empirical evidence for the interventionist claims. It is represented by Davies (1974, p. 74), who writes as follows.
That the entropic behaviour of branch systems is essentially unchanged by the continuous interaction with the outside world always present, is confirmed by many familiar examples from everyday life. To take an example, it is clear that an ice cube placed in a lukewarm drink will melt whether or not minute random influences from the rest of the galaxy are disturbing the molecules therein.





The second objection touches on one of the more fundamental questions in statistical mechanics, asking what sort of explanations we require of this theory for the phenomena it studies. This objection is represented by Albert (1994, p. 672). Albert proposes that random perturbations have a central role in explaining the success of statistical mechanics, and says:
The perturbations in question here are going to have to be genuinely random, which is to say that they are going to have to be concerned with real physical chances in the fundamental laws of nature. That seems to have had a way of uncannily escaping people's attention. It has often been suggested in the literature, for example, that those perturbations can be seen as arising simply from the interactions of the … system … with its environment (see, for example, Blatt 1959). But so long as whatever constitutes the environment … is subject to the same sorts of deterministic laws as the constituents of [the system] are, that sort of thing will patently get us nowhere: whatever perturbations arise from interactions with an environment like that will be 'random' (if that's the word for it) only in the explanatorily irrelevant sense that nobody happens to be aware of precisely what they are.
 
(Albert's proposal is discussed in Hemmo and Shenker 2001.) As we have seen in section 2.2, interventionism does not preclude a dynamic explanation for thermodynamic phenomena such as the approach to equilibrium. Quite the contrary: such an explanation fits interventionism. Interventionism brings ignorance into the picture once we try to use the dynamical explanation to provide predictions. For to make predictions it is not enough to state that the present and future are determined by the past. To make predictions we need to state what this past actually was, for the system of interest as well as the relevant environment. And since, as a matter of fact, this information is not available to us, our ignorance leads us to use probability considerations. Our ignorance is taken into account when we form our best guesses regarding the future evolution of the system. When the actual evolution is later observed (whether or not it turns out to accord with our guess), we do not say that this evolution was caused or brought about by our ignorance. What we do say is that the actual evolution was brought about by the dynamics of the system, and that our ignorance played a role in the guesses we formed, in the conjectures we were ready to make or risk we were ready to take, before the process actually took place. The result is that our ignorance is indeed, as Albert says, explanatorily irrelevant, but it is predictively relevant. And this is all that interventionism claims here. 
	Awareness of the distinction between explanation and prediction prevents us from committing Price's (1996) double standard fallacy, for we consciously put in a time asymmetry originating in our experience, by hand, without claiming that this experience reflects a fundamental asymmetry in nature. (See also last paragraph in section 3.3 below.)

3.3.	Parity of reasoning: Time-symmetric interactions cannot bring about time asymmetry.

By an argument that exactly parallels the one used by the interventionist to show that ensemble entropy is increased into the future by random influence from the outside, we can argue that the entropy of the ensemble representing our system ought to be higher in the past than it is at the time in question. This would lead us (or, rather, mislead us) to infer the false conclusion that it was highly probable that the systems were earlier in a more disordered state (Sklar 1993, p. 254).
Similarly,
Even in the presence of external influences, there could well be some high entropy microstate C, on any given occasion, that would, given the specific external influence I present on that occasion, result in [a lower entropy microstate] A. … How do we know that there isn't some state C that compensates, so to speak, for the outside interference in just the right way to bring it about that C+IA? (Horwich 1987, p. 65).
 
In short, this objection says that time-symmetric interactions between the system and environment cannot bring about a time-asymmetric evolution of the system. This claim is, of course, correct. However it does not give rise to an objection to interventionism (as described in section 2), because interventionism does not claim otherwise. Interventionism uses the environment to predict the unknown future, not to explain the known past. The past is known (or conjectured) to have been more ordered than the present; otherwise there is no ground to the claim that the idea, that the past was more disordered, is false. 
	And so, even if our line of reasoning implies that the past was more disordered with high probability, we know (or conjecture) that as a matter of fact what actually occurred was the improbable situation, in which the past was more ordered than the present. With respect to the future, on the other hand, who knows? All we can do is guess, and then wait and see whether the more probable or the less probable state of affairs will materialise. By parity of reasoning, we ought not to deny the possibility that the future may actually turn out to be more ordered than the present.
	This point emphasises that interventionism does not explain the arrow of time. It assumes that the explication of this arrow will come from a different field of science. "Recognised asymmetric assumptions are acceptable, as long as we see that they simply shift the explanatory burden from one place to another" (Price 1996, p. 47). Given an arrow of time, and given that the past and present of the system of interest are known (macroscopically and to some finite degree of precision), and that the state of the environment is considerably less known (for its constitution, and not only its state, is unknown), environmental interactions can play the role they do in interventionism, as described in section 2 above. 

3.4.	Interventionism requires dynamical instability.

It is also important to remark that the interventionist explanation of entropic increase requires as one of its components just the reliance upon instabilities of trajectories and coarse-grained spreading of the ensemble that the advocate of internally generated coarse-grained entropic increase relies on. For it is only this that guarantees the spreading of the initial order into the correlations so extraordinarily sensitive to perturbation from the outside. Essentially, unless the evolution of the ensemble under its internal dynamic was from a coherent to a greatly fibrillated one, external perturbation could not succeed in converting the ensemble into a genuinely fine-grained equilibrium ensemble by slight perturbations of the trajectories of the member systems. So the advocate of coarse-graining as the source of entropic increase is likely to find the interventionist final step unnecessary. From this point of view, entropy has increased, in a form sufficient to explain the observed thermodynamic increase, even if the perturbation from the outside never occurs (Sklar 1993, 253-254).
 
Once again, the claim itself is true, but does not make the interventionist final step unnecessary. Several ideas are involved here. First, in a Gibbsian framework, only coarse-grained entropy can change. The notion of coarse-grained entropy is, however, problematic (see Ridderbos and Redhead 1998 and Ridderbos 2001), and is brought in only in order to overcome the contradiction between the stationarity of fine-grained entropy and the Second Law of thermodynamics. By seeing the system's trajectory as a projection of the trajectory of the universe, interventionism shows how to justify the idea that the fine-grained entropy of the system can change, although the fine-grained entropy of the whole universe is conserved.​[6]​ 
In a Boltzmannian framework the difficulties are different and so is the contribution of interventionism. Here we do not focus on the ensemble but on the individual trajectories. In this approach, the evolution of the accessible phase space volume to a fibrillated form is not sufficient to account for the thermodynamic behaviour of a system. It is the trajectory of the individual system, not the volume of the ensemble that has to cover (in some sense) the accessible region. The problem is to show that the dynamics can generally provide such a trajectory. Here is where interventionism helps. This can be seen in two ways. One point of view is that the actual trajectory of the system is a patchwork made of segments of different trajectories, between which the system jumps due to external perturbations. It is the patchwork trajectory, and not any of the trajectories whose segments make it up, that has to cover the whole accessible region. And so what the dynamics has to provide is not the structure of an individual trajectory, but instability in the sense that nearby trajectories (between which small perturbations are enough to make the system jump) diverge quickly. Another approach emphasises that the trajectory of the system of interest, being a projection of the trajectory of the universe, is in the general case branching out (to the future as well as to the past), in what appears to be an effectively indeterministic trajectory. The actual trajectory follows one evolution among the many possible ones. Again, the dynamical properties we have to prove are those of the effectively indeterministic trajectory of the system of interest, and not those of the whole universe.




We now turn to a closer look at some of the notions that take part in the interventionist account of thermodynamic phenomena. Interventionism claims that some of the thermodynamic properties of a system are determined by its internal dynamics as well as its interaction with the environment. This claim refers to the notions of system and environment. Clearly, these notions play a central role in interventionism. To assess interventionism and clarify the disputes around it, it may be useful to begin by examining what these notions mean and what their roles in interventionism are. The notion of system will guide us through some further details regarding the contents of interventionism (which was discussed in section 2 above), and the notion of environment will guide us through its methodology. We begin with the system and the contents.
The notion of system is fundamental in physics. The analytical form of mechanics, which is used in statistical mechanics, differs considerably in its method and viewpoint from vectorial mechanics. Newton’s vectorial approach focuses on the particle and the forces which act on it, while in the analytical approach “the single particle has no significance; it is the system as a whole which counts” (Lanczos 1970, pp. 3-4) .
What is a system? Surprisingly, perhaps, the fundamental physical theories do not give us a sharp and universal criterion for dividing the universe into systems. At least not in any way that corresponds to what we would like to call a system in our everyday life, which reasonably corresponds to what thermodynamics would like to call a system. Considerations pertaining to relative strength of interaction, relative spatial distance, and like criteria all involve vagueness, in a way that precludes seeing any of them as a well enough defined physical universal criterion for being a system. Duration of existence is no guide either, for we first have to know what are the features that endure (compare Horwich 1987, pp. 66-67, discussed in section 4.5 below). If perfect isolation were the usual case we might have a reasonable objective criterion, but it isn’t. The systems around us are normally open.​[7]​ 
	On the other hand, for pragmatic reasons we cannot just give up the notion of a system. With all its unclarity, it is too central for our everyday and scientific ontology. Extreme holism is very impractical. And since the difficulty is pragmatic, its solution should be as well.​[8]​ A system, then, should be any part of the universe we are interested in as such, for reasons of convenience or by convention.
	In statistical mechanical terminology, a system will consist of some degrees of freedom out of those in the universe, and its phase space trajectory will be a projection of the trajectory of the whole universe. This formulation is very egalitarian: all degrees of freedom have the same status. And so it is hard to show, on the basis of some universal criterion, that one division or projection is preferable to another. 
	These considerations have one very strange and quite radical implication. Since no rule of dividing the universe into sub-systems makes universal physical and unambiguous sense, the division is not unique. Arguably, then, the concept of a system has no unique or well-defined reference or definite extension. Maybe it ought to be eliminated from our physical ontology. 
	The idea that the notion of system has no unique extension may sound unpleasantly subjectivist to some people. So let me emphasise that it is not. Quite the contrary. By emphasising the effect of our position, preferences and capabilities on the way things appear to us, we make their role explicit, and remove their effect from our ontology. Thus, the idea that the notion of system, so central to our experience, has no unique reference or definite extension, is perfectly compatible with the Copernican spirit, in which we are not at the centre of the stage.
Of course, from a realistic point of view, the way things appear is determined by the way things are.​[9]​ But this last claim, while true, does not increase our predictive capabilities, for predictions are about how things appear to us. This is a very general philosophical problem. This paper is only meant to bring it to the surface, and we discuss it no further.
	Realising this nature of the notion of system requires a change in the way we understand some of the properties of systems. And some of the properties that are most strongly affected by the problematic nature of the notion of system are its thermodynamic properties.

4.1.	The spin echo experiments

To illustrate the way this nature of the notion of system can affect our understanding of properties in general and thermodynamic properties in particular, I use the famous example of the spin echo experiments (Hahn 1950 and 1953, Ridderbos and Redhead 1998). The dispute around interventionism, which we are now trying to clarify, surfaces quite strongly in connection with these experiments. Blatt (1959), for instance, sees these experiments as a paradigmatic case from which we ought to learn about the universal role of environmental interventions. Davies (1974, p. 74), on the other hand, remarks that the lessons people learn from the spin echo experiments are only relevant for other people wishing to perform these experiments. But this view is mistaken. The spin echo experiments, due to their extreme circumstances, illustrate general ideas that have independent support, in the physical as well as the philosophical level. The problems regarding the non-uniqueness of the reference of system are, perhaps, among the more philosophically radical of them.
A crude and semi-classical description of the experiments goes like this. A collection of spins, coming mainly from hydrogen atoms in some liquid, is aligned along the x direction. Then a strong constant magnetic field is applied in the z direction. The spins undergo Larmor precession about this z field, consequently emitting characteristic electromagnetic signals. The spins start their precession in phase, which is a state of great orderliness at the micro level. Since the precession is in phase, the signals add up in a constructive way, and the strong combined electromagnetic signal at time t=0 is macroscopic evidence for the initial state of dynamic order. The order decays in time. Since the z field is not homogeneous throughout the collection, the spins precess with slightly different frequencies, and at time  their axes are more or less uniformly distributed in all directions. The macroscopic evidence for this decay of order is a decrease in the intensity of the combined macroscopic electromagnetic signal, until it effectively disappears at t=; see the schematic illustration in Figure 1.
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At this point one performs a complex manipulation of fields, as a result of which the spins are reflected in the xz plane, see Figure 2. Once the reflection has been performed the z field is reapplied, causing the proton spins to continue their precession about the z direction. The reflection has brought the faster spinning spins to the rear (see Figure 2), but, since they continue to be the fastest, they quickly catch up with the slow spins. As a result, at time t=2 all the spins are realigned in the x direction. The macroscopic evidence for the recovery of order is an echo: the macroscopic electromagnetic signal reappears (see Figure 1). 
The process is then repeated: having crossed the starting aligned state, the spins continue the precession. At t=3 they are again spread out, and are again reflected in the xz plane. At t=4 they are realigned, and the echo reappears. 
The reflection in the xz plane (Figure 2) is often likened to a Loschmidt reversal. Although it is not strictly speaking a velocity reversal, its effect is very much like one, since in both cases the fast systems come to lag behind the slow ones, but in time catch up with them, resulting in a return to the initial situation at t=2.
The fluctuations of the electromagnetic signal do not continue forever. Their maxima gradually decay (see Figure 1) until, at some point, no echo signal reappears, despite a repetition of the field switching. Why is that so? One possible explanation involves the spins' interaction with their environment. A spin that exchanges energy with its environment thus changes its frequency and will not return to the aligned state together with the others. This is the interventionist account of the spin echo experiment (Hahn 1950 and 1953, Blatt 1959, Ridderbos and Redhead 1998). The environmental interventions are brought in to account for the decay of the maxima, not for the fluctuations. The fluctuations as such have nothing to do with the environmental perturbations. They are an outcome of the unusual circumstances of the experiment.
To see the challenge that the spin echo experiments present for the foundations of statistical mechanics, compare the decaying fluctuations of the electromagnetic signal in Figure 1 with the decaying amplitude of an oscillating pendulum. In both cases the decays are explained by reference to the environment, and are not particularly problematic. The difficulty is with respect to the oscillations. In the case of the pendulum the oscillations can be derived from the laws of mechanics. The fluctuations of the electromagnetic signal in the spin echo experiments, on the other hand, are often interpreted as corresponding to fluctuations in entropy, and these are forbidden by the Second Law of thermodynamics and do not even agree with the predictions about the frequency with which entropy is expected to change according to Boltzmannian statistical mechanics. This is why the oscillations of the pendulum are not problematic, while the recurrence of the spin echo is.

4.2.	The system in the spin echo experiments

Returning to our conceptual analysis of interventionism, let us see how the notion of system functions in explaining the spin echo experiment. What is the system in this experiment? In one natural way of dividing the universe, the system is the collection of spins. This choice is natural and very reasonable because it allows us to describe the system in macroscopic terms, namely, in terms of the combined macroscopic electromagnetic signal. But it is not the only possible choice. Another choice would be the spins and everything that has interacted with them during the time of the experiment. Actually, this latter choice may be preferred by proponents of the isolated systems approach.
	This flexibility in dividing the universe into systems plays a central role in the dispute about interventionism, as illustrated by the spin echo experiments. If our system is the collection of spins, then the fluctuations are an induced evolution, brought about by the external agent manipulating the magnetic fields. And if our system includes everything that has interacted with the spins during the experiment directly or indirectly (possibly the whole universe), that is, if our system is effectively isolated during that period, then the evolution is spontaneous. The two ways of dividing the universe into systems lead to interpreting the phenomenon as two sorts of evolution, for which interventionism offers two kinds of explanation, as we saw in section 2 above. This idea can be generalised: induced and spontaneous evolutions are not two kinds of phenomenon, but two points of view on the same phenomenon. These points of view are determined by the way we choose to divide the universe into systems, a choice that determines which, precisely, is our system of interest.

4.3.	Real and quasi equilibrium in the spin echo experiment

Before describing the spin echo experiment from these two points of view let us present a useful conceptual distinction proposed by Blatt (1959, p. 749), which is closely connected to the distinction between induced and spontaneous evolution. Blatt distinguishes real equilibrium from quasi equilibrium.​[10]​ Quasi equilibrium is a state where an induced Loschmidt reversal (a guaranteed return to an exact past micro-configuration plus exactly opposite velocities, obtained by reversing the velocities)​[11]​ is in principle possible. All we need is suitable technology. In real equilibrium, a Loschmidt reversal is impossible, in principle and regardless of technology. 
Blatt’s distinction is puzzling. In a deterministic underlying dynamics a Loschmidt reversal is, in principle, always possible. And in an indeterministic dynamics a Loschmidt reversal is never possible. But how can the same underlying dynamics make a reversal possible in principle in one case and impossible in principle in another? Interventionism solves the puzzle by suggesting that environmental interactions make the difference. The idea of a Loschmidt reversal is only applicable for as long as effective isolation can be maintained. The problem is to find the technology that, given effective isolation, will bring about a reversal of the system’s microevolution. Finding such a technology is no simple matter at all, but it is not a theoretical impossibility, as the spin echo experiments demonstrate. However, once an interaction has taken place, a Loschmidt reversal becomes a theoretical impossibility. It requires reversing those degrees of freedom of the environment that are involved in the interaction, as well as those of the system of interest. Manipulating the system alone, without its environment, is no longer sufficient to bring about a return to the initial state. Since in normal cases perturbations take over very quickly, systems can be in real equilibrium even before they reach quasi-equilibrium; in other words, irreversibility can precede coarse-grained equilibrium.
The unique circumstances of the spin echo experiment enable us to see the difference between real and quasi equilibrium. The effect of the environment on the spins is slow enough to let us see what happens before the perturbations take over, that is, to see the fluctuations in which the minima are states of quasi-equilibrium (see Figure 1). And it is fast enough to let us observe the outcome of the environment's action, namely, the decay of the maxima towards real equilibrium.​[12]​ This interplay is the interventionist account for the difference between the minima of the fluctuations and the point of no recovery. Until today, the spin echo experiments are the only ones fulfilling the two requirements: one, that the effect of the environmental interaction is slow enough during the time of interest, and two, that we have the technology to bring about the reversal. This combination makes these experiments so special and so interesting.

4.4.	The spin echo experiment as an induced process in the open spins system

Unique as the spin echo experiments may be, they illustrate a general principle, namely, that induced Loschmidt reversals are possible for effectively isolated systems (technological difficulties notwithstanding). And so the fact, expressed in the Second Law of thermodynamics, that in the general case we cannot induce reversals, is explained by the combination of two factors: first, that it is extremely difficult to control a microscopic degree of freedom; and second, that it is extremely difficult to maintain effective isolation of the degrees of freedom in which we are interested.
This is a modest and not very dramatic conclusion. I take this to be an advantage.

4.5.	The spin echo experiment as a spontaneous process in the isolated universe
	
The difficulty of bringing about induced microevolutions is only one aspect of the thermodynamic phenomena, and not the most difficult of them. A graver difficulty is encountered when trying to account for the universal tendency to spontaneously approach equilibrium. Spontaneous evolutions obviously have nothing to do with whether or not anyone knows anything about the evolving system. At the same time, when we speak of spontaneous evolutions, we mean the spontaneous evolutions of thermodynamic systems, and thermodynamic systems are human constructs. Clearly, for finite intervals of time, dividing the universe in different ways will reveal different thermodynamic evolutions. 
Normally, we don’t play with dividing the universe in different ways. Our interests dictate our division. And our interests are such that we take systems to be collections of particles that are ordered in the sense of, say, space and time proximity and chemical bonds. For instance, we would not normally take, as a system, a collection of air molecules, one in each room at the Hebrew University. Indeed, why should we take such a collection to be a system? We have no interest in it as such. 
This anthropic aspect of systems has the following implication. It is sometimes said that the notion of order in statistical mechanics is not an anthropocentric one: 
It is not a question of pleasant order or unpleasant disorder. …We measure 'disorder' by the number of ways that the insides can be arranged, so that from the outside it looks the same. (Feynman, Leighton and Sands 1963, vol. 1, p. 46-7).
 
Nevertheless, the opinion that the notion of order is not anthropocentric is, I suggest, only partly correct. Consider the collection of air molecules from the Hebrew University's rooms. It may plausibly be the case that every now and then there exists such a collection in which the velocity of all its molecules is identical (to a good approximation). This collection, this system, is a case of a spontaneous increase of order. Thus spontaneous increases of order possibly happen around us all the time. Why do we still say that such occurrences are extremely unlikely? The reason is that we do not call such collections systems; and our claim is that a spontaneous increase of order in systems is unlikely. The objective existence of order in the sense of phase space proximity is thus concealed by the anthropocentric division of the universe into systems.
	Both the universe and our interests change.
The systems we observe have not always existed and will not exist forever. They were brought into being; …and they will eventually be destroyed. Reichenbach coined the name "branch system" for these systems. (Horwich 1987, p. 66)
 
Classically, there is no genuine creation or annihilation in the world. What, then, do creation and destruction mean here? They mean that a collection of particles and fields is organised at some time in a way that makes us interested in this collection as such, but later on changes its organisation so that we are no longer interested in it as such. The collection does not cease to exist, but some of its features change (e.g., its mass stays unchanged but the relative positions of its constituents change). These features determine whether or not this collection is considered a system.
So we start out, in a clearly time-asymmetric way, with systems that are ordered, in some anthropocentric notion of order (add this idea to the reply to the objection in section 3.3 above). And since we start out with a high degree of order we see the decay of order more than its increase. Horwich (1987, pp. 66-67) explains this from his slightly different point of view thus:
Although in permanently isolated systems each microstate arises equally likely often in the long run, and although both drops and rises in entropy are equally likely developments in an eternal system, it does not follow (and moreover it is quite implausible) that in the creation of systems, the microstates that will lead to entropy drops, and those that will lead to rises, are brought about with equal frequency.
 
Why is that so? The reason is that we select (and thereby create) the system of interest so that it initially has a very low entropy.
In sum, the time asymmetry cannot be brought in by the environmental interactions, for these interactions are clearly time-symmetric (see section 3.3 above). The time asymmetry is brought in by our pre-selection of systems. Increases of order may happen: collections of Hebrew University air molecules may spontaneously assume almost identical velocities. But this does not threaten our idea of the universality of the evolution of open systems to equilibrium, because we don’t call these collections systems.
The last paragraph brings to the surface the fact that the open-systems approach does not explain the arrow of time, but simply uses it. Using the notion of system, it accounts for the universal decrease of order with time. This account is given in the objective terms of initial conditions (see section 2.2 above), and at the same time uses the flexible notion of systems and our anthropic criteria for pre-selecting them.

4.6.	What the flexible notion of system can provide, and what it can't.

The anthropic criterion for pre-selecting systems is, of course, not the whole story. As the reader has probably noticed, it can explain the rareness of spontaneous evolutions away from equilibrium only if one already assumes that for any given selection of a system the probability that it will evolve away from equilibrium is very small. (We may be surrounded by spontaneous increases of order only because the number of ways in which we can divide the universe into systems is so enormous.) The assumption that the probability of an increase of order in any given system is negligible is notoriously hard to justify, and the freedom or flexibility in dividing the universe into systems does not solve this problem. So it seems that we are back to square one, with the old problem of accounting for the approach to equilibrium in dynamical terms. 




Discussing the notion of system gave us some further ideas about the content of the interventionist claims. We now proceed to examine the methodology of this approach, which is rather problematic. To do this we shall use the notion complementary to system, which is environment. Environment is a residual notion. It is whatever is not the system, that interacts with the system during the time of interest. It is very difficult to refer to the environment in a non-residual way, that is, as if it were a system too. One reason is its sheer vastness and complexity. Another difficulty is that the environment itself has an environment, and so on. If we want to include in the environment everything that interacts with our system directly or indirectly, so as to have an isolated system, we may end up with the whole universe anyway. A third difficulty is that we ourselves, as physical observers, are part of the environment. 
Considering the environment a residual notion means that, whereas the state of the system can, in principle, be given to us with some degree of precision, the state of the environment is completely unknown to us. Not only is its state unknown, but normally also its composition. This prevents any non-probabilistic reference to its state.
	The interventionist focus on ignorance about the environment replaces the more traditional focus on isolated systems, where ignorance refers to the state of the system, expressed by coarse graining and the notion of macrostate. The unpredictability, which results from not knowing the initial state of the system, is replaced by unpredictability resulting from not knowing the forces in the problem. This difference may indicate a way to explain the success of the statistical-mechanics recipes. Replacing one domain of ignorance by another changes the way we understand and explain what goes on, but both sorts of ignorance may lead to the same statistical-mechanics predictions, if appropriate probability distributions are used. In other words, interventionism claims that the traditional statistical-mechanics recipes work despite the fact that the causal mechanisms they employ are the wrong ones. And the reason for this success is that these recipes insert ignorance into the description of the problem, in a way that mimics the true, interventionist, causal account. 




Our ignorance with respect to the environment is not absolute, of course. There are some things we do know about it. One is that the environment is subject to the same laws of nature as the system. Another is the way the environment affects the system. The way the environment affects the system is given to us by way of elimination, as follows. The internal dynamics of the system is (supposedly) known to us, to some extent. We also know that the recipes of statistical mechanics work, in the right circumstances. And - as things stand now - we suspect that there is a gap between this internal dynamics and these recipes. How can we close this gap? According to interventionism, the job of closing the gap is carried out by the environment. Why the environment, and not something else? Here we turn to plausibility considerations. For example, we consider some calculations showing the dramatic effect of small perturbations on normal thermodynamic systems. Having discovered (or, rather, conjectured) the effect of the environment by way of elimination, we then construct models​[14]​ of the environment that obey our physical theories and yield the desired effect - the effect already discovered in the elimination stage. A good model would be a possibility proof for interventionism. (Examples are Bergmann and Lebowitz 1955 and, in the quantum mechanical domain, and with fewer details, Hemmo and Shenker 2001.) 
	It is important to be precise about what the elimination provides and what the models add to it. As we have seen in section 2, interventionism accepts and even emphasises that the present state of everything was caused by the initial state of the universe. It adds, however, that this realisation helps us very little as far as prediction of the system's evolution is concerned. To obtain prediction, we first have to retrodict the universe's initial state, on the basis of what's available now. And all that's available now is what we can see and deduce by way of elimination. 
	But, since we don't know the constitution of the environment, elimination cannot possibly provide us with the state of the environment. And so elimination cannot provide us with what we would need in order to derive the future evolution by the equations of motion. The only thing that elimination can give us is the effect of the environment on the system. This effect is given in terms of relative frequencies in the time series of impacts and perturbations. The relative frequencies of past interactions, which are found by elimination, are conjectured, by empirical generalisation, to persist in the future. This conjecture is subject to empirical testing.
	This is what elimination provides. What the models add is possible constitutions and states of the environment that, if they were the case, would have yielded the effect on the system that is discovered by the elimination. Therefore models are possibility proofs for interventionism. 
	One consequence of our emphasis on the system being open, and the use of elimination, is that statistical mechanics ceases to be a fully experimental science. It remains empirical in the same sense that cosmology is. We can observe nature, but are unable to control and reproduce some very important parameters. In statistical mechanics we can learn what the environment does to the system, by way of elimination, but we cannot control its effect. Statistical mechanical experiments cease to be fully reproducible. Some people may find this unpleasant. However, whether or not a science is fully experimental is unfortunately not up to us.

5.2.	Some difficulties with the elimination method

I shall now examine some difficulties with the interventionist method of elimination and modelling discussed in the previous section. On the face of it, this method seems both begging the question and irrefutable. It begs the question because we assume that the gap between the internal dynamics and the successful statistical mechanical recipes can be closed by the environment, and then construct models of the environment that yield this pre-supposed result. Moreover, if we don't succeed in constructing such a model, this does not refute the conjecture, since a more successful model has perhaps simply not yet been discovered. 
	If indeed interventionism begs the question and is irrefutable, it does not deserve our serious attention. But there is a way out. The way out is that interventionism is not a concrete physical conjecture or theory, but a general program that suggests a promising line of research. It is a recommendation, backed up by plausibility considerations, to look for how the gap can be closed in the environment. In other words, interventionism does not claim that the solution is actually there, but urges us to try out this possibility. This means constructing models of the constitution and state of the environment. These models are our concrete theories, which no longer beg the question, and are refutable.
Of course, a research proposal can fail. When would we reject interventionism? One possibility is that its presuppositions will be proved wrong. For instance, we might prove that our physical theories and data are such that the gap between the internal dynamics and the successful statistical mechanical recipes cannot possibly be closed by the environment. Such an objection has not yet been brought up.




To sum up, I would like to focus on the role which ignorance and the anthropic choice of systems plays in interventionism, versus the role of dynamics. Ignorance and the anthropic choice of systems do not lead to an approach to equilibrium, whether quasi or real. The state of a system is an outcome of the initial state of the universe and its dynamics, and has nothing to do with whether or not anyone is watching, or with the way anyone chooses to divide the universe into systems. Full stop. Interventionism endorses this idea without qualifications (see sections 2.2 and 3.2).
What ignorance does bring about is the following. First, it limits our ability to bring about induced reversals in selected systems, as well as our ability to select those sub-systems of the universe which undergo spontaneous reversals and evolutions away from equilibrium. The role which ignorance plays here is perfectly objective, for it is the role of a point of view. Second, ignorance takes part in our predictions, which are our best guesses about the future evolution of the system. Ignorance appears in the way we think about processes before they take place. Once they occur, and we are engaged in explanation rather than prediction, we no longer turn to our (now past) ignorance to account for them, but to dynamical considerations. 
From this perspective, the notions of irreversibility and of equilibrium are relative to the way we choose to divide the universe into systems, and the selection of the system on which we focus our attention. As we change our selections, our claims about reversibility and our predictions about equilibrium change too. And if we prefer to give up the notions of system and environment altogether, seeing the universe as an indivisible whole, then irreversibility and real equilibrium disappear (where “real equilibrium” is Blatt's term; section 4.3 above). 
	In short, the interventionist account of thermodynamics and of the success of statistical mechanics is not fully dynamical. On the contrary, it emphasises the role of the observer, both in choosing the system of interest and in conjecturing the relative frequencies of the environmental perturbations. From some philosophical points of view this is a shortcoming. On other philosophical accounts this is an advantage. For a universe without a point of view may be more objective, but it is not the universe as we see it; it is not our universe.
	As I said in the introduction, interventionism is treated in the literature in a very peculiar way. People return to it time and again, only to dismiss it quickly and decidedly. Perhaps part of the explanation for this peculiarity is this. Interventionism, as presented here, is a defensible approach. It offers a reasonable account of the success of the recipes of mainstream statistical mechanics, and the principal objections to it can be met. Since, however, as things now stand, no approach to statistical mechanics has conclusive arguments, the philosophical background of the different approaches may play a role in people’s preferences. Interventionism, in the version presented here, carries with it non-trivial philosophical baggage. We have seen some elements of it, which make reversibility a property of evasive and almost non-existent entities, and makes equilibrium depend on our descriptions, turning statistical mechanics into an empirical but not fully experimental science. For some people, this may be a high philosophical price. For others, it is not a price at all, but a philosophical advantage.
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^1	  The various principles that are all called "the Second Law" are discussed in Uffink (2000).
^2	  Compare Sklar's (1973) discussion of the connection between explanation and prediction in this context.
^3	  Of course, we must also be able to solve the equations of motion. This aspect of the problem is not addressed here.
^4	  Schmidt (1997) claims that all the events that ever happen in a classical (non-quantum mechanical) universe are encoded in each of the universe's parts, and so predictions of future evolution of open systems can be made on the basis of local observational data only, with arbitrary accuracy, regardless of the influence of their environment. One difficulty with Schmidt's argument is that it assumes or requires physical dualism: the measuring device, the memory storage and the computing mechanism are not subject to the same laws of physics as the systems of interest that are being measured and their environment. These devices are demonic in the same sense that Laplace's demon must be in order to prevent the paradoxes and infinite regress associated with self-prediction.
^5	  In this context the idea of coarse-graining entails that regions that are inaccessible, given the initial ensemble plus equations of motion, are given non-zero probability, thereby making them appear to be accessible. This way, coarse-graining contradicts classical mechanics, on which the approach is based. See Ridderbos (2001).
^6	  Mayer (1961), in a paper generally supporting interventionism, says that the idea of coarse-graining "is correct, but as classically given is incomplete" (p. 1210), and that interventionism merely serves to complete it. However, the details of his argument show that Mayer actually proposes that the fine-grained entropy is changed by the external perturbations. These interventions "smooth" (in his term) the probability density, and this "smoothing" is real and objective and not merely due to our poor resolution capabilities.
^7	  This raises difficulties with respect to the constitution of any given system and its identity, which can be solved. See Needham (1999) and Guttmann (1999), pp. 187-188.
^8	  The present discussion is purely classical; I do not address quantum holism.
^9	  Although the manner in which reality determines appearance can be quite complex, as in the case of quantum mechanics.
^10	  Another relevant distinction, by Bergmann and Lebowitz (1955), p. 578, is between equilibrium and stationary states. Equilibrium is said the be the appropriate term for isolated systems, while stationary states are said to apply to open systems, where they can be maintained using gradients in the system. By the definition of Callen (1985), on the other hand, the stationary state is equilibrium, for “in practice the criterion for equilibrium is circular. Operationally, a system is in an equilibrium state if its properties are consistently described by thermodynamic theory!” (p. 15). 
^11	  Other notions of reversal are discussed in Uffink (2000).
^12	  Hahn (1950) p. 580 emphasises the importance of this slow-fast nature of the environmental effect.
^13	  The notion of control may be very instructive in trying to understand the spin echo experiment. The system's evolution away from (coarse-grained and quasi) equilibrium is not completely spontaneous, as it is a consequence of manipulating the magnetic fields. But this non-spontaneity does not solve the difficulty posed by the experiment, for the following reason. The change in the magnetic fields causes the system to jump over from one point to another in its phase space. But it does not change the overall probability distribution, and, moreover, the pre-jump and post-jump states belong to the same macrostate. This is the reason why the evolution away from (coarse-grained and quasi) equilibrium challenges both the Gibbsian and the Boltzmannian approaches to statistical mechanics. As Ridderbos and Redhead (1998) and Ridderbos (2001) show in their papers, the notion of coarse graining fails to capture aspects of the spin echo experiment that appear to be necessary for understanding it in a satisfactory way. The notion of control helps to understand what these aspects are. 	In the spin echo experiment, once the magnetic field manipulation stage is over, the spins are left to evolve spontaneously (uncontrollably). Not knowing the details of the inhomogeneities in the field intensity, the experimenter is unable to know the exact microscopic state of the spins. The information the experimenter can have about the state of the spins is macroscopic, such as the intensity of the electromagnetic signal. Nevertheless, the physics of the situation is such that using macroscopic operations the experimenter is able to manipulate the system at the microscopic level with amazing precision. In other words, the experimenter is able to control the system with a much greater precision than she can know the system's state! The usual story that statistical mechanics tells us correlates knowledge and control, requiring that the information available will be at least as precise as the level of possible control. For instance, a common understanding of Loschmidt's reversal employs a Loschmidt demon, which has information about the microscopic state, information that is used to manipulate the system at the microscopic level. But the spin echo experiment doesn’t use a Loschmidt demon. Therefore, the inequality that requires that we have at least as much information as control is violated. This is a new twist to Loschmidt's objection, this time brought up by nature itself.	Even in the spin echo experiment, we can only have more control than information for a short period of time, sufficient for a few echoes. Once the environmental perturbations have taken over, the signal is not recoverable. To gain microscopic control at this stage we need microscopic information. The general inequality that requires that we have more information than control holds sway. 
^14	  I do not expand on the notion of model and modelling here. The notion I use should be understood from the claim that Blatt (1959), Bergmann and Lebowitz (1955) and Hemmo and Shenker (2000) discuss such models.
